Vladimir Putin’s description of Khamenei as “an outstanding statesman” following his death was more than diplomatic courtesy — it reflected a genuine alignment of interests between Moscow and Tehran that has deepened significantly in recent years. The two countries have been brought together by their shared adversarial relationship with the United States and their mutual exclusion from the Western-led international order.
Russia and Iran have cooperated closely on Syria, where both countries supported the Assad government against various opposition forces. More recently, the relationship has included Iranian military equipment supplied to Russia for use in its war against Ukraine, a development that significantly expanded the practical dimensions of the partnership.
For Russia, the death of Khamenei and the consequent uncertainty in Iran represents a complication. A friendly, stable Iran is a strategic asset for Moscow; an Iran consumed by internal power struggles and potentially open to Western engagement is less useful. Russia’s public mourning for Khamenei is partly a signal to Tehran’s new leadership that Moscow intends to maintain the relationship.
The durability of the Russia-Iran relationship under a new Supreme Leader will depend heavily on who that leader is and what strategic priorities they adopt. An IRGC-backed hardliner would likely maintain close ties with Moscow. A more pragmatic figure oriented toward Western engagement might seek to recalibrate — though history suggests that such recalibrations are easier to aspire to than to achieve.
China’s position is similarly significant. Beijing condemned the assassination as unacceptable while maintaining its own extensive economic relationships with Iran. As US-China competition intensifies, Iran’s potential value as an energy supplier and strategic partner to China provides Tehran with a degree of leverage that its new leaders may seek to exploit.